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Abstract
Quantum Cryptography uses the counter-intuitive properties of Quantum Mechanics
for performing cryptographic tasks in a secure and reliable way. The Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important
types of attacks: collective attacks and joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a
modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing
is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows
the framework of a previous paper [1], but it avoids a classical information-theoretical
analysis and proves a fully composable security. We show that this modified BB84
protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that
it requires more bits for testing.
Keywords: Collective Attacks, Quantum Key Distribution, Cryptography, Error Rate,
Test Bits, Information Bits.
1. Introduction
Cryptography is the science of protecting the security and correctness of data against
adversaries. One of the most important cryptographic problems is the problem of en-
cryption – namely, of transferring a secret message from a sender to a receiver. Two
main encryption methods are used today:
1. In symmetric-key cryptography, the same secret key is used for both the sender
and the receiver: the sender uses the secret key for encrypting his or her message,
and the receiver uses the same secret key for decrypting the message. Examples
of symmetric-key ciphers include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2],
the older Data Encryption Standard (DES), and one-time pad (“Vernam cipher”).
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2. In public-key cryptography [3], a public key (known to everyone) and a secret
key (known only to the receiver) are used: the sender uses the public key for
encrypting his or her message, and the receiver uses the secret key for decrypting
the message. Examples of public-key ciphers include RSA [4] and elliptic curve
cryptography.
One of the main problems with current public-key cryptography is that its security is
not formally proved. Moreover, its security relies on the computational hardness of
specific computational problems, such as integer factorization and discrete logarithm
(that can both be efficiently solved on a quantum computer, by using Shor’s factoriza-
tion algorithm [5]; therefore, if a scalable quantum computer is successfully built in
the future, the security of many public-key ciphers, including RSA and elliptic curve
cryptography, will be broken). Symmetric-key cryptography requires a secret key to
be shared in advance between the sender and the receiver (in other words, if the sender
and the receiver want to share a secret message, they must share a secret key before-
hand). Moreover, no security proofs for many current symmetric-key ciphers, such as
AES and DES, are known (even if one is allowed to rely on the computational hardness
of problems), and unconditional security proofs against computationally-unlimited ad-
versaries are impossible unless the secret key is used only once and is at least as long
as the secret message [6].
The one-time pad (symmetric-key) cipher, that, given a message M and a secret
key K of the same length, defines the encrypted message C to be C = M⊕K (and then
decryption can be performed by computing M = C⊕K), is fully and unconditionally
secure against any adversary [6] – namely, even if the adversary Eve intercepts the en-
crypted message C, she gains no information about the original message M (assuming
that she has no information about the secret key K). This means that, for obtaining
perfect secrecy, all that is needed is an efficient way for sharing a random secret key
between the sender and the receiver; unfortunately, “classical key distribution” cannot
be achieved in a fully secure way if the adversary can listen to all the communication
between Alice and Bob.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols take advantage of the laws of quan-
tum mechanics for achieving fully and unconditionally secure key distribution, so that
their resulting final key can later be used by other cryptographic primitives (e.g., one-
time pad encryption). Most of the QKD protocols have security proofs applicable even
against adversaries whose only limitations are the laws of nature (and who are other-
wise capable of solving any computational problem and of performing any physically-
allowed operation). The two parties (the first party is usually named “Alice”, and the
second party is usually named “Bob”) want to create a shared random key, and they
use an insecure quantum channel and an unjammable classical channel (to which the
adversary may listen, but not interfere). The adversary (eavesdropper), Eve, tries to get
as much information as she can on the final shared key. The first and most important
QKD protocol is BB84 [7], that uses four possible quantum states (see details below),
and it has been proven fully and unconditionally secure.
Boyer, Gelles, and Mor [1] discussed the security of BB84 against collective at-
tacks. The class of the “collective attacks” [8, 9, 10] is an important and powerful
subclass of the joint attacks; the class of the “joint attacks” includes all the theoretical
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attacks allowed by quantum physics. [1] improved the security proof of Biham, Boyer,
Brassard, van de Graaf, and Mor [10] against collective attacks, by using some tech-
niques of Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury [11] (that proved security
against joint attacks). In this paper, too, we restrict the analysis to collective attacks, be-
cause security against collective attacks is conjectured (and, in some security notions,
proved [12, 13]) to imply security against joint attacks. In addition, proving security
against collective attacks is much simpler than proving security against joint attacks.
Other QKD protocols, either similar to BB84 or ones that use different approaches,
have also been suggested, and in some cases have also been proven fully secure. In par-
ticular, the “three-state protocol” [14] uses only three quantum states, and it has been
proven secure [15, 16, 17]; the “classical Bob” protocol [18] is a two-way protocol such
that only Alice has quantum capabilities and Bob has only classical capabilities, and it
has been proven robust [18] and secure [19]; and the “classical Alice” protocol [20] is
similar to “classical Bob” with Alice being the classical participant instead of Bob, and
it has been proven robust [21].
The above QKD protocols are all “Discrete-Variable” protocols. Two other classes
of QKD protocols, “Continuous-Variable” protocols and “Distributed-Phase-Reference”
protocols, have also been suggested; their security proofs are still weaker than the se-
curity proofs of “Discrete-Variable” protocols (see [22] for details).
QKD protocols can be used as a subroutine (secure key distribution) of more com-
plicated cryptographic protocols. In other words, they can be integrated into a system
in order to improve its security: see [23] for more details about this integration.
In many QKD protocols, including BB84, Alice and Bob exchange several types
of bits (encoded as quantum systems, usually qubits): INFO bits, that are secret bits
shared by Alice and Bob and are used for generating the final key (via classical pro-
cesses of error correction and privacy amplification); and TEST bits, that are publicly
exposed by Alice and Bob (by using the classical channel) and are used for estimating
the error rate. In BB84, each bit is sent from Alice to Bob in a random basis (the z basis
or the x basis).
In this paper, we extend the analysis of BB84 done in [1] and prove the security
of a QKD protocol we shall name BB84-INFO-z. This protocol is almost identical to
BB84, except that all its INFO bits are in the z basis. In other words, the x basis is used
only for testing. The bits are thus partitioned into three disjoint sets: INFO, TEST-Z,
and TEST-X. The sizes of these sets are arbitrary (n INFO bits, nz TEST-Z bits, and nx
TEST-X bits).
We note that, while this paper follows a line of research that mainly discusses a
specific approach of security proof for BB84 and similar protocols (this approach, no-
tably, considers finite-key effects and not only the asymptotic error rate), many other
approaches have also been suggested: see for example [24, 25, 12, 26].
In contrast to the line of research adopted here (of [8, 9, 10, 11, 1]), in which
a classical information-theoretical analysis caused problems with composability (see
definition in [12] and in Subsection 1.1), in this paper we suggest a method to prove
a fully composable security: we calculate the trace distance between any two density
matrices Eve may hold, instead of calculating the classical mutual information between
Eve and the final key (as done in those previous papers). This method is implemented in
this paper for proving the fully composable security of BB84-INFO-z against collective
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attacks; it also directly applies to the BB84 security proof in [1] against collective
attacks, proving the fully composable security of BB84 against collective attacks. It
may be extended in the future to show that the BB84 security proof of [11] proves the
fully composable security of BB84 against joint attacks.
The “qubit space”,H2, is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space. The states |00〉, |10〉 form
an orthonormal basis of H2, called “the computational basis” or “the z basis”. The
states |01〉, |00〉+|10〉√
2
and |11〉, |00〉−|10〉√
2
form another orthonormal basis ofH2, called
“the x basis”. Those two bases are said to be conjugate bases.
In this paper, we denote bit strings (of t bits, with t ≥ 0 being some integer) by
a bold letter (e.g., i = i1 . . . it with i1, . . . , it ∈ {0,1}); and we refer to those bit strings
as elements of Ft2 – that is, as elements of a t-dimensional vector space over the field
F2 = {0,1}, where addition of two vectors corresponds to a XOR operation between
them. The number of 1-bits in a bit string s is denoted by |s|, and the Hamming distance
between two strings s and s′ is dH(s,s′) = |s+ s′|.
1.1. Security Definitions of Quantum Key Distribution
Originally, a QKD protocol was defined to be secure if the (classical) mutual in-
formation between Eve’s information and the final key, maximized over all the possi-
ble attack strategies and measurements by Eve, is exponentially small in the number
of qubits, N. Examples of security proofs of BB84 that use this security definition
are [24, 11, 25]. Those security proofs used the observation that one cannot analyze
the classical data held by Eve before privacy amplification (as done in [27]), but must
analyze the quantum state held by Eve [28]. In other words, they assumed that Eve
could keep her quantum state until the end of the protocol, and only then choose the
optimal measurement (based on all the data she observed) and perform the measure-
ment.
Later, it was noticed that this security definition may not be “composable”. In other
words, the final key is secure if Eve measures the quantum state she holds at the end
of the QKD protocol, but the proof does not apply to cryptographic applications (e.g.,
encryption) of the final key: Eve might gain non-negligible information after the key is
used, even though her information on the key itself was negligible. This means that the
proof is not sufficient for practical purposes. In particular, those applications may be
insecure if Eve keeps her quantum state until Alice and Bob use the key (thus giving
Eve some new information) and only then measures.
Therefore, a new notion of “(composable) full security” was defined [29, 26, 12]
by using the trace distance between quantum states, following universal composability
definitions for non-quantum cryptography [30, 31]. Intuitively, this notion means that
the final joint quantum state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the protocol is very
close (namely, the trace distance is exponentially small in N) to their final state at
the end of an ideal key distribution protocol, that distributes a completely random and
secret final key to both Alice and Bob. In other words, if a QKD protocol is secure,
then except with an exponentially small probability, one of the two following events
happens: the protocol is aborted, or the secret key generated by the protocol is the
same as a perfect key that is uniformly distributed (i.e., each possible key having the
4
same probability), is the same for both parties, and is independent of the adversary’s
information.
Formally, ρABE is defined as the final quantum state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at
the end of the protocol (with Alice’s and Bob’s states being simply the “classical”
states |kA〉A and |kB〉B, where kA and kB are bit strings that are the final keys held by
Alice and Bob, respectively (note that usually kA = kB); and with Eve’s state including
both her quantum probe and the classical information published in the unjammable
classical channel); ρU is defined as the complete mixture of all the possible keys that
are the same for Alice and Bob (namely, if the set of possible final keys is K, then
ρU = 1|K| ∑k∈K |k〉A|k〉B〈k|A〈k|B); and ρE is defined as the partial trace of ρABE over the
system AB. For the QKD protocol to be fully (and composably) secure, it is required
that
1
2
tr |ρABE −ρU ⊗ρE | ≤ ε, (1)
where ε is exponentially small in N. Intuitively, ρABE is the actual joint state of Alice,
Bob, and Eve at the end of the QKD protocol; ρU is the ideal final state of Alice and
Bob (an equal mixture of all the possible final keys, that is completely uncorrelated
with Eve and is the same for Alice and Bob); and ρE is the state of Eve, uncorrelated
with the states of Alice and Bob. Note that cases in which the protocol is aborted are
represented by the zero operator: see [12, Subsection 6.1.2] for details.
Composable security of many QKD protocols, including BB84, has been proved [29,
26, 12].
2. Full Definition of the Protocol “BB84-INFO-z”
Below we formally define all the steps of the BB84-INFO-z protocol, as used in
this paper.
1. Before the protocol, Alice and Bob choose some shared (and public) parameters:
numbers n, nz, and nx (we denote N , n+nz +nx), error thresholds pa,z and pa,x,
an r×n parity check matrix PC (corresponding to a linear error-correcting code
C), and an m× n privacy amplification matrix PK (representing a linear key-
generation function). It is required that all the r+m rows of the matrices PC and
PK put together are linearly independent.
2. Alice randomly chooses a partitionP = (s,z,b) of the N bits by randomly choos-
ing three N-bit strings s,z,b ∈ FN2 that satisfy |s| = n, |z| = nz, |b| = nx, and
|s + z + b| = N. Thus, P partitions the set of indexes {1,2, ...,N} into three
disjoint sets:
• I (INFO bits, where s j = 1) of size n;
• TZ (TEST-Z bits, where z j = 1) of size nz; and
• TX (TEST-X bits, where b j = 1) of size nx.
3. Alice randomly chooses an N-bit string i ∈ FN2 and sends the N qubit states
|ib11 〉, |ib22 〉, . . . , |ibNN 〉, one after the other, to Bob using the quantum channel. No-
tice that Alice uses the z basis for sending the INFO and TEST-Z bits, and that
5
she uses the x basis for sending the TEST-X bits. Bob keeps each received qubit
in quantum memory, not measuring it yet1.
4. Alice sends to Bob over the classical channel the bit string b = b1 . . .bN . Bob
measures each of the qubits he saved in the correct basis (namely, when measur-
ing the i-th qubit, he measures it in the z basis if bi = 0, and he measures it in the
x basis if bi = 1).
The bit string measured by Bob is denoted by iB. If there is no noise and no
eavesdropping, then iB = i.
5. Alice sends to Bob over the classical channel the bit string s. The INFO bits
(that will be used for creating the final key) are the n bits with s j = 1, while the
TEST-Z and TEST-X bits (that will be used for testing) are the nz +nx bits with
s j = 0. We denote the substrings of i,b that correspond to the INFO bits by is
and bs, respectively.
6. Alice and Bob both publish the bit values they have for all the TEST-Z and TEST-
X bits, and they compare the bit values. If more than nz · pa,z TEST-Z bits are
different between Alice and Bob or more than nx · pa,x TEST-X bits are different
between them, they abort the protocol. We note that pa,z and pa,x (the pre-agreed
error thresholds) are the maximal allowed error rates on the TEST-Z and TEST-X
bits, respectively – namely, in each basis (z and x) separately.
7. The values of the remaining n bits (the INFO bits, with s j =1) are kept in secret
by Alice and Bob. The bit string of Alice is denoted x = is, and the bit string of
Bob is denoted xB.
8. Alice sends to Bob the syndrome of x (with respect to the error-correcting code
C and to its corresponding parity check matrix PC), that consists of r bits and is
defined as ξ = xPTC . By using ξ , Bob corrects the errors in his x
B string (so that
it is the same as x).
9. The final key consists of m bits and is defined as k = xPTK . Both Alice and Bob
compute it.
The protocol is defined similarly to BB84 (and to its description in [1]), except
that it uses the generalized bit numbers n, nz, and nx (numbers of INFO, TEST-Z, and
TEST-X bits, respectively); that it uses the partition P = (s,z,b) for dividing the N-bit
string i into three disjoint sets of indexes (I, TZ , and TX ); and that it uses two separate
thresholds (pa,z and pa,x) instead of one (pa).
3. Proof of Security for the BB84-INFO-z Protocol Against Collective Attacks
3.1. The General Collective Attack of Eve
Before the QKD protocol is performed (and, thus, independently of i and P), Eve
chooses some collective attack to perform. A collective attack is bitwise: it attacks
1 Here we assume that Bob has a quantum memory and can delay his measurement. In practical imple-
mentations, Bob usually cannot do that, but is assumed to measure in a randomly-chosen basis (z or x), so
that Alice and Bob later discard the qubits measured in the wrong basis. In that case, we need to assume that
Alice sends more than N qubits, so that N qubits are finally detected by Bob and measured in the correct
basis.
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each qubit separately, by using a separate probe (ancillary state). Each probe is at-
tached by Eve to the quantum state, and Eve saves it in a quantum memory. Eve can
keep her quantum probes indefinitely, even after the final key is used by Alice and
Bob; and she can perform, at any time of her choice, an optimal measurement of all
her probes together, chosen based on all the information she has at the time of the mea-
surement (including the classical information sent during the protocol, and including
the information she acquires when Alice and Bob use the key).
Given the j-th qubit |ib jj 〉Tj sent from Alice to Bob (1 ≤ j ≤ N), Eve attaches a
probe state |0E〉E j and applies some unitary operator U j of her choice to the compound
system |0E〉E j |i
b j
j 〉Tj . Then, Eve keeps to herself (in a quantum memory) the subsystem
E j, which is her probe state; and sends to Bob the subsystem Tj, which is the qubit sent
from Alice to Bob (which may have been modified by her attack U j).
The most general collective attack U j of Eve on the j-th qubit, represented in the
orthonormal basis {|0b j〉Tj , |1b j〉Tj}, is
U j|0E〉E j |0b j〉Tj = |E
b j
00〉E j |0b j〉Tj + |E
b j
01〉E j |1b j〉Tj (2)
U j|0E〉E j |1b j〉Tj = |E
b j
10〉E j |0b j〉Tj + |E
b j
11〉E j |1b j〉Tj , (3)
where |Eb j00〉E j , |E
b j
01〉E j , |E
b j
10〉E j , and |E
b j
11〉E j are non-normalized states in Eve’s probe
system E j attached to the j-th qubit.
We thus notice that Eve can modify the original product state of the compound sys-
tem, |0E〉E j |i
b j
j 〉Tj , into an entangled state (e.g., |E
b j
00〉E j |0b j〉Tj + |E
b j
01〉E j |1b j〉Tj ). Eve’s
attack may thus cause Bob’s state to become entangled with her probe. On the one
hand, this may give Eve some information on Bob’s state; on the other hand, this causes
disturbance that may be detected by Bob. The security proof shows that the informa-
tion obtained by Eve and the disturbance caused by Eve are inherently correlated: this
is the basic reason QKD protocols are secure.
3.2. Results from [1]
The security proof of BB84-INFO-z against collective attacks is very similar to the
security proof of BB84 itself against collective attacks, that was detailed in [1]. Most
parts of the proof are not affected at all by the changes made to BB84 to get the BB84-
INFO-z protocol (changes detailed in Section 2 of the current paper), because those
parts assume fixed strings s and b, and because the attack is collective (so the analysis
is restricted to the INFO bits).
Therefore, the reader is referred to the proof in Section 2 and Subsections 3.1 to 3.5
of [1], that applies to BB84-INFO-z without any changes (except changing the total
number of bits, 2n, to N, which does not affect the proof at all), and that will not be
repeated here.
We denote the rows of the error-correction parity check matrix PC as the vectors
v1, . . . ,vr in Fn2, and the rows of the privacy amplification matrix PK as the vectors
vr+1, . . . ,vr+m. We also define, for every r′, Vr′ , Span{v1, ...,vr′}; and we define
dr,m , min
r≤r′<r+m
dH(vr′+1,Vr′) = min
r≤r′<r+m
dr′,1. (4)
7
For a 1-bit final key k ∈ {0,1}, we define ρ̂k to be the state of Eve corresponding
to the final key k, given that she knows ξ . Thus,
ρ̂k =
1
2n−r−1 ∑
x
∣∣ xPTC = ξ
x · vr+1 = k
ρb
′
x , (5)
where ρb′x is Eve’s state after the attack, given that Alice sent the INFO bit string x
encoded in the bases b′ = bs. The state ρ˜k, that is a lift-up of ρ̂k (which means that ρ̂k
is a partial trace of ρ˜k), was also defined in [1].
In the end of Subsection 3.5 of [1], it was found that (in the case of a 1-bit final key,
i.e., m = 1)
1
2
tr |ρ˜0− ρ˜1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|CI | ≥ dr,12 | BI = b
′,s
]
, (6)
where CI is a random variable whose value is the n-bit string of errors on the n INFO
bits; BI is a random variable whose value is the n-bit string of bases of the n INFO bits;
b′ is the bit-flipped string of b′ = bs; and dr,1 (and, in general, dr,m) was defined above.
Now, according to [32, Theorem 9.2 and page 407], and using the fact that ρ̂k is a
partial trace of ρ˜k, we find that 12 tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 12 tr |ρ˜0− ρ˜1|. From this result and from
inequality (6) we deduce that
1
2
tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|CI | ≥ dr,12 | BI = b
′,s
]
. (7)
3.3. Bounding the Differences Between Eve’s States
We define c , i+ iB: namely, c is the XOR of the N-bit string i sent by Alice and
of the N-bit string iB measured by Bob. For all indexes 1≤ l ≤ N, cl = 1 if and only if
Bob’s l-th bit value is different from the l-th bit sent by Alice. The partition P divides
the N bits into n INFO bits, nz TEST-Z bits, and nx TEST-X bits. The corresponding
substrings of the error string c are cs (the string of errors on the INFO bits), cz (the
string of errors on the TEST-Z bits), and cb (the string of errors on the TEST-X bits).
The random variables that correspond to cs, cz, and cb are denoted by CI , CTZ , and
CTX , respectively.
We define C˜I to be a random variable whose value is the string of errors on the
INFO bits if Alice had encoded and sent the INFO bits in the x basis (instead of the z
basis dictated by the protocol). In those notations, inequality (7) reads as
1
2
tr |ρ̂0− ρ̂1| ≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,12 | P
]
= 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,12 | cz,cb,P
]
, (8)
using the fact that Eve’s attack is collective, so the qubits are attacked independently,
and, therefore, the errors on the INFO bits are independent of the errors on the TEST-Z
and TEST-X bits (namely, of cz and cb).
As explained in [1], inequality (8) was not derived for the actual attack U = U1⊗
. . .⊗UN applied by Eve, but for a virtual flat attack (that depends on b and therefore
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could not have been applied by Eve). That flat attack gives the same states ρ̂0 and ρ̂1
as given by the original attack U , and it gives a lower (or the same) error rate in the
conjugate basis. Therefore, inequality (8) holds for the original attack U , too. This
means that, starting from this point, all our results apply to the original attack U rather
than to the flat attack.
So far, we have discussed a 1-bit key. We will now discuss a general m-bit key k.
We define ρ̂k to be the state of Eve corresponding to the final key k, given that she
knows ξ :
ρ̂k =
1
2n−r−m ∑
x
∣∣xPTC = ξ
xPTK = k
ρb
′
x (9)
Proposition 1. For any two keys k,k′ of m bits,
1
2
tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ | ≤ 2m
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
. (10)
Proof. We define the key k j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, to consist of the first j bits of k′ and the
last m− j bits of k. This means that k0 = k, km = k′, and k j−1 differs from k j at most
on a single bit (the j-th bit).
First, we find a bound on 12 tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |: since k j−1 differs from k j at most on a
single bit (the j-th bit, given by the formula x · vr+ j), we can use the same proof that
gave us inequality (8), attaching the other (identical) key bits to ξ of the original proof;
and we find that
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j | ≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ d j2 | cz,cb,P
]
, (11)
where we define d j as dH(vr+ j,V ′j), and V ′j ,Span{v1,v2, . . . ,vr+ j−1,vr+ j+1, . . . ,vr+m}.
Now we notice that d j is the Hamming distance between vr+ j and some vector in
V ′j , which means that d j =
∣∣∑r+mi=1 aivi∣∣ with ai ∈ F2 and ar+ j 6= 0. The properties of
Hamming distance assure us that d j is at least dH(vr′+1,Vr′) for some r ≤ r′ < r +m.
Therefore, we find that dr,m = minr≤r′<r+m dH(vr′+1,Vr′)≤ d j.
The result dr,m ≤ d j implies that if |C˜I | ≥ d j2 then |C˜I | ≥
dr,m
2 . Therefore, inequal-
ity (11) implies
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j | ≤ 2
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
. (12)
Now we use the triangle inequality for norms to find
1
2
tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ |=
1
2
tr |ρ̂k0 − ρ̂km | ≤
m
∑
j=1
1
2
tr |ρ̂k j−1 − ρ̂k j |
≤ 2m
√
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
, (13)
as we wanted.
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The value we want to bound is the expected value (namely, the average) of the
trace distance between two states of Eve corresponding to two final keys. However, we
should take into account that if the test fails, no final key is generated, and the distance
between all of Eve’s states becomes 0 for any purpose. We thus define the random
variable ∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′) for any two final keys k,k′:
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb),
 12 tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ | if
|cz|
nz
≤ pa,z and |cb|nx ≤ pa,x
0 otherwise
(14)
We need to bound the expected value 〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉, that is given by:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉= ∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb) · p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (15)
(In Subsection 3.6 we prove that this is indeed the quantity we need to bound for
proving full composability, defined in Subsection 1.1.)
Theorem 2.
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 ≤ 2m
√
P
[( |C˜I |
n ≥
dr,m
2n
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
(16)
where |C˜I |n is a random variable whose value is the error rate on the INFO bits if they
had been encoded in the x basis,
|CTZ |
nz
is a random variable whose value is the error
rate on the TEST-Z bits, and
|CTX |
nx
is a random variable whose value is the error rate
on the TEST-X bits.
Proof. We use the convexity of x2, namely, the fact that for all {pi}i satisfying pi ≥ 0
and ∑i pi = 1, it holds that (∑i pixi)
2 ≤ ∑i pix2i . We find that:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉2
=
[
∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb) · p(P,ξ ,cz,cb)
]2
(by (15))
≤ ∑
P,ξ ,cz,cb
(
∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k
′|P,ξ ,cz,cb)
)2 · p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by convexity of x2)
= ∑
P,ξ , |cz|nz ≤pa,z,
|cb|
nx ≤pa,x
( 1
2 tr |ρ̂k− ρ̂k′ |
)2 · p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by (14))
≤ 4m2 · ∑
P,ξ , |cz|nz ≤pa,z,
|cb |
nx ≤pa,x
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
· p(P,ξ ,cz,cb) (by (10))
= 4m2 · ∑
P, |cz|nz ≤pa,z,
|cb|
nx ≤pa,x
P
[
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2 | cz,cb,P
]
· p(P,cz,cb)
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= 4m2 ·∑
P
P
[(
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)
| P
]
· p(P)
= 4m2 ·P
[(
|C˜I | ≥ dr,m2
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
(17)
as we wanted.
3.4. Proof of Security
Following [1] and [11], we choose matrices PC and PK such that the inequality
dr,m
2n > pa,x + ε is satisfied for some ε (we will explain in Subsection 3.7 why this is
possible). This means that
P
[( |C˜I |
n ≥
dr,m
2n
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
≤ P
[( |C˜I |
n > pa,x + ε
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
. (18)
We will now prove the right-hand-side of (18) to be exponentially small in n.
As said earlier, the random variable C˜I corresponds to the bit string of errors on the
INFO bits if they had been encoded in the x basis. The TEST-X bits are also encoded in
the x basis, and the random variable CTX corresponds to the bit string of errors on those
bits. Therefore, we can treat the selection of the indexes of the n INFO bits and the
nx TEST-X bits as a random sampling (after the numbers n, nz, and nx and the indexes
of the TEST-Z bits have all already been chosen) and use Hoeffding’s theorem (that is
described in Appendix A of [1]).
Therefore, for each bit string c1 . . .cn+nx that consists of the errors in the n + nx
INFO and TEST-X bits if the INFO bits had been encoded in the x basis, we apply
Hoeffding’s theorem: namely, we take a sample of size n without replacement from
the population c1, . . . ,cn+nx (this corresponds to the random selection of the indexes
of the INFO bits and the TEST-X bits, as defined above, given that the indexes of the
TEST-Z bits have already been chosen). Let X = |C˜I |n be the average of the sample (this
is exactly the error rate on the INFO bits, assuming, again, that the INFO bits had been
encoded in the x basis); and let µ = |C˜I |+|CTX |n+nx be the expectancy of X (this is exactly the
error rate on the INFO bits and TEST-X bits together). Then
|CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x is equivalent
to (n+nx)µ−nX ≤ nx · pa,x, and, therefore, to n ·(X−µ)≥ nx ·(µ− pa,x). This means
that the conditions
( |C˜I |
n > pa,x + ε
)
and
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)
rewrite to
(
X−µ > ε+ pa,x−µ
)∧( n
nx
· (X−µ)≥ µ− pa,x
)
, (19)
which implies
(
1+ nnx
)
(X − µ) > ε , which is equivalent to X − µ > nxn+nx ε . Using
Hoeffding’s theorem (from Appendix A of [1]), we get:
P
[(
|C˜I |
n
> pa,x + ε
)
∧
( |CTX |
nx
≤ pa,x
)]
≤ P
[
X−µ > nx
n+nx
ε
]
≤ e−2
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2
(20)
In the above discussion, we have actually proved the following Theorem:
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Theorem 3. Let us be given δ > 0, R > 0, and, for infinitely many values of n, a family
{vn1, . . . ,vnrn+mn} of linearly independent vectors in Fn2 such that δ <
drn ,mn
n and
mn
n ≤ R.
Then for any pa,z, pa,x > 0 and εsec > 0 such that pa,x +εsec ≤ δ2 , and for any n,nz,nx >
0 and two mn-bit final keys k,k′, the distance between Eve’s states corresponding to k
and k′ satisfies the following bound:
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 ≤ 2Rne
−
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2sec (21)
In Subsection 3.7 we explain why the vectors required by this Theorem exist.
We note that the quantity 〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′)〉 bounds the expected values of the
Shannon Distinguishability and of the mutual information between Eve and the final
key, as done in [1] and [11], which is sufficient for proving non-composable security;
but it also avoids composability problems: Eve is not required to measure immediately
after the protocol ends, but she is allowed to wait until she gets more information. In
Subsection 3.6 we use this bound for proving a fully composable security.
3.5. Reliability
Security itself is not sufficient; we also need the key to be reliable (namely, to be
the same for Alice and Bob). This means that we should make sure that the num-
ber of errors on the INFO bits is less than the maximal number of errors that can be
corrected by the error-correcting code. We demand that our error-correcting code can
correct n(pa,z +εrel) errors (we explain in Subsection 3.7 why this demand is satisfied).
Therefore, reliability of the final key with exponentially small probability of failure is
guaranteed by the following inequality: (as said, CI corresponds to the actual bit string
of errors on the INFO bits in the protocol, when they are encoded in the z basis)
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa,z + εrel
)
∧
( |CTZ |
nz
≤ pa,z
)]
≤ e−2
( nz
n+nz
)2
nε2rel (22)
This inequality is proved by an argument similar to the one used in Subsection 3.4: the
selection of the indexes of the INFO bits and the TEST-Z bits is a random partition of
n+ nz bits into two subsets of sizes n and nz, respectively (assuming that the indexes
of the TEST-X bits have already been chosen), and thus it corresponds to Hoeffding’s
sampling.
3.6. Proof of Fully Composable Security
We now prove that the BB84-INFO-z protocol satisfies the definition of compos-
able security for a QKD protocol: namely, that it satisfies equation (1) presented in
Subsection 1.1. We prove that the expression 12 tr |ρABE −ρU ⊗ρE | is exponentially
small in n, with ρABE being the actual joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve; ρU being an
ideal (random, secret, and shared) key distributed to Alice and Bob; and ρE being the
partial trace of ρABE over the system AB.
To make reading easier, we use the following notations, where i is the bit string sent
by Alice, iB is the bit string received by Bob, and c = i⊕ iB is the string of errors:
iABT ,
(
iz, ib, iBz , i
B
b
)
(23)
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T ,
{
1 if |cz|nz ≤ pa,z and
|cb|
nx
≤ pa,x
0 otherwise
(24)
In other words, iABT consists of all the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits of Alice and Bob; and
T is the random variable representing the result of the test.
According to the above definitions, the states ρABE and ρU are
ρABE = ∑
i,iB,P|T=1
P
(
i, iB,P) · |k〉A〈k|A⊗|k′〉B〈k′|B
⊗
(
ρb
′
x,xB
)
E
⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C (25)
ρU =
1
2m ∑k
|k〉A〈k|A⊗|k〉B〈k|B, (26)
where
(
ρb′x,xB
)
E
is defined to be Eve’s quantum state if Alice sends the INFO string
x = is in the bases b′ = bs and Bob gets the INFO string xB = iBs . All the other states
actually represent classical information: subsystems A and B represent the final keys
held by Alice (k = xPTK ) and Bob (k′, that is obtained from xB, ξ = xPTC , and PK), and
subsystem C represents the information published in the unjammable classical channel
during the protocol (this information is known to Alice, Bob, and Eve) – namely, iABT
(all the test bits), P (the partition), and ξ = xPTC (the syndrome).
We note that in the definition of ρABE , we sum only over the events in which the
test is passed (namely, in which the protocol is not aborted by Alice and Bob): in
such cases, an m-bit key is generated. The cases in which the protocol aborts do not
exist in the sum – namely, they are represented by the zero operator, as required by
the definition of composable security (see Subsection 1.1 and [12, Subsection 6.1.2]).
Thus, ρABE is a non-normalized state, and tr(ρABE) is the probability that the test is
passed.
To help us bound the trace distance, we define the following intermediate state:
ρ ′ABE , ∑
i,iB,P|T=1
P
(
i, iB,P) · |k〉A〈k|A⊗|k〉B〈k|B
⊗
(
ρb
′
x,xB
)
E
⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C (27)
This state is identical to ρABE , except that Bob holds the Alice’s final key (k) instead of
his own calculated final key (k′). In particular, the similarity between ρABE and ρ ′ABE
means, by definition, that ρE , trAB (ρABE) and ρ ′E , trAB (ρ ′ABE) are the same state:
namely, ρE = ρ ′E .
Proposition 4. Under the same conditions as Theorem 3, it holds that
1
2
tr
∣∣ρ ′ABE −ρU ⊗ρE ∣∣≤ 2Rne−( nxn+nx )2nε2sec , (28)
for ρ ′ABE and ρU defined above and for the partial trace ρE , trAB (ρABE).
13
Proof. We notice that in ρ ′ABE , the only factors depending directly on x and x
B (and
not only on k and ξ ) are the probability P
(
i, iB,P) and Eve’s state (ρb′x,xB)E . The
probability can be reformulated as:
P
(
i, iB,P) = P(iABT ,P,ξ) ·P(k | iABT ,P,ξ)
· P(x | k, iABT ,P,ξ) ·P(xB | x,k, iABT ,P,ξ)
= P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · 1
2m
· 1
2n−r−m
·P(xB | x,k, iABT ,P,ξ) (29)
(Because all the possible n-bit values of x have the same probability, 12n ; and because
all the r + m rows of the matrices PC and PK are linearly independent, so there are
exactly 2n−r−m values of x corresponding to each specific pair (ξ ,k).)
Therefore, the state ρ ′ABE takes the following form:
ρ ′ABE =
1
2m ∑
k,iABT ,P,ξ |T=1
P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · |k〉A〈k|A⊗|k〉B〈k|B
⊗
 12n−r−m ∑
x,xB
∣∣xPTC = ξ
xPTK = k
P
(
xB | x,k, iABT ,P,ξ
) ·(ρb′x,xB)E

⊗ |iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C
=
1
2m ∑
k,iABT ,P,ξ |T=1
P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · |k〉A〈k|A⊗|k〉B〈k|B
⊗ (ρ̂k)E ⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C (30)
(ρ̂k was defined in equation (9).)
The partial trace ρ ′E = trAB (ρ ′ABE), that (as proved above) is the same as ρE , is
ρE = ρ ′E =
1
2m ∑
k,iABT ,P,ξ |T=1
P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · (ρ̂k)E ⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C, (31)
and the state ρU ⊗ρE is
ρU ⊗ρE = 122m ∑
k,k′′,iABT ,P,ξ |T=1
P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · |k〉A〈k|A⊗|k〉B〈k|B
⊗ (ρ̂k′′)E ⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C. (32)
By using the triangle inequality for norms, since ρ ′ABE and ρU⊗ρE are the same (except
the difference between Eve’s states, (ρ̂k)E and (ρ̂k′′)E ), we get, by using the definition
of 〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′′)〉 (equation (15)) and Theorem 3:
1
2
tr
∣∣ρ ′ABE −ρU ⊗ρE ∣∣ ≤ 122m ∑
k,k′′,iABT ,P,ξ |T=1
P
(
iABT ,P,ξ
) · 1
2
tr |(ρ̂k)E − (ρ̂k′′)E |
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=
1
22m ∑k,k′′
〈∆(pa,z,pa,x)Eve (k,k′′)〉
≤ 2Rne−
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2sec (33)
as we wanted.
We still have to bound the following difference:
ρABE −ρ ′ABE = ∑
i,iB,P|T=1
P
(
i, iB,P)
· |k〉A〈k|A⊗
[|k′〉B〈k′|B−|k〉B〈k|B]
⊗
(
ρb
′
x,xB
)
E
⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C
= P
((
k 6= k′)∧ (T = 1))
· ∑
i,iB,P
P
(
i, iB,P | (k 6= k′)∧ (T = 1))
· |k〉A〈k|A⊗
[|k′〉B〈k′|B−|k〉B〈k|B]
⊗
(
ρb
′
x,xB
)
E
⊗|iABT ,P,ξ 〉C〈iABT ,P,ξ |C (34)
Because the trace distance between every two normalized states is bounded by 1, and
because of the reliability proof in Subsection 3.5, we get:
1
2
tr
∣∣ρABE −ρ ′ABE ∣∣≤ P((k 6= k′)∧ (T = 1))≤ e−2( nzn+nz )2nε2rel (35)
(Because if k 6= k′, Alice and Bob have different final keys, and this means that the
error correction stage did not succeed. According to the discussion in Subsection 3.5,
this can happen only if there are too many errors in the information string – namely, if
|CI |
n > pa,z + εrel.)
To sum up, we get the following bound:
1
2
tr |ρABE −ρU ⊗ρE | ≤ 12 tr
∣∣ρABE −ρ ′ABE ∣∣+ 12 tr ∣∣ρ ′ABE −ρU ⊗ρE ∣∣
≤ e−2
( nz
n+nz
)2
nε2rel +2Rne−
( nx
n+nx
)2
nε2sec (36)
This bound is exponentially small in n. Thus, we have proved the composable security
of BB84-INFO-z.
3.7. Security, Reliability, and Error Rate Threshold
According to Theorem 3 and to the discussion in Subsection 3.5, to get both secu-
rity and reliability we only need vectors {vn1, . . . ,vnrn+mn} satisfying both the conditions
of the Theorem (distance drn ,mn2n >
δ
2 ≥ pa,x+εsec) and the reliability condition (the abil-
ity to correct n(pa,z + εrel) errors). Such families were proven to exist in Appendix E
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(0.0756, 0.0756)
Figure 1: The secure asymptotic error rates zone for BB84-INFO-z (below the curve)
of [11], giving the bit-rate:
Rsecret ,
m
n
= 1−H2(2pa,x +2εsec)−H2
(
pa,z + εrel +
1
n
)
(37)
where H2(x),−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Note that we use here the error thresholds pa,x for security and pa,z for reliability.
This is possible, because in [11] those conditions (security and reliability) on the codes
are discussed separately.
To get the asymptotic error rate thresholds, we require Rsecret > 0, and we get the
condition:
H2(2pa,x +2εsec)+H2
(
pa,z + εrel +
1
n
)
< 1 (38)
The secure asymptotic error rate thresholds zone is shown in Figure 1 (it is below
the curve), assuming that 1n is negligible. Note the trade-off between the error rates
pa,z and pa,x. Also note that in the case pa,z = pa,x, we get the same threshold as BB84
([11] and [1]), which is 7.56%.
4. Discussion
In the current paper, we have proved the BB84-INFO-z protocol to be fully se-
cure against collective attacks. We have discovered that the results of BB84 hold very
similarly for BB84-INFO-z, with only two exceptions:
1. The error rates must be separately checked to be below the thresholds pa,z and
pa,x for the TEST-Z and TEST-X bits, respectively, while in BB84 the error rate
threshold pa applies to all the TEST bits together.
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2. The exponents of Eve’s information (security) and of the failure probability of
the error-correcting code (reliability) are different than in [1], because different
numbers of test bits are now allowed (nz and nx are arbitrary). This implies that
the exponents may decrease more slowly (or more quickly) as a function of n.
However, if we choose nz = nx = n (thus sending N = 3n qubits from Alice to
Bob), then we get exactly the same exponents as in [1].
The asymptotic error rate thresholds found in this paper allow us to tolerate a higher
threshold for a specific basis (say, the x basis) if we demand a lower threshold for the
other basis (z). If we choose the same error rate threshold for both bases, then the
asymptotic bound is 7.56%, exactly the bound found for BB84 in [11] and [1].
We conclude that even if we change the BB84 protocol to have INFO bits only in the
z basis, this does not harm its security and reliability (at least against collective attacks).
This does not even change the asymptotic error rate threshold. The only drawbacks of
this change are the need to check the error rate for the two bases separately, and the
need to either send more qubits (3n qubits in total, rather than 2n) or get a slower
exponential decrease of the exponents required for security and reliability.
We thus find that the feature of BB84, that both bases are used for information, is
not very important for security and reliability, and that BB84-INFO-z (that lacks this
feature) is almost as useful as BB84. This may have important implications on the
security and reliability of other protocols that, too, use only one basis for information
qubits, such as [14] and some two-way protocols [18, 20].
We also present a better approach for the proof, that uses the quantum distance
between two states rather than the classical information. In [1], [10], and [11], the clas-
sical mutual information between Eve’s information (after an optimal measurement)
and the final key was calculated (by using the trace distance between two quantum
states); although we should note that in [1] and [11], the trace distance was used for the
proof of security of a single bit of the final key even when all other bits are given to Eve,
and only the last stages of the proof discussed bounding the classical mutual informa-
tion. In the current paper, on the other hand, we use the trace distance between the two
quantum states until the end of the proof, which allows us to prove fully composable
security.
Therefore, our proof shows the fully composable security of BB84-INFO-z against
collective attacks (and, in particular, security even if Eve keeps her quantum states until
she gets more information when Alice and Bob use the key, rather than measuring them
at the end of the protocol); and a very similar approach can be applied to [1], imme-
diately proving the composable security of BB84 against collective attacks. Our proof
also makes a step towards making the security proof in [11] (security proof of BB84
against joint attacks) prove the composable security of BB84 against joint attacks.
Our results show that the BB84-INFO-z protocol can be securely used for distribut-
ing a secret key; the security is of an ideal implementation and against an adversary
limited to collective attacks (it may be possible to generalize the proof, so that it ap-
plies to the most general attacks (joint attacks), by using the methods of [11], but such
generalization is beyond the scope of the current paper). Moreover, the security of the
final key is universally composable, which means that the key may be used for any
cryptographic purpose without harming the security, even if Eve keeps her quantum
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states and uses all the information she gets in the future in an optimal way.
The techniques described in our proof may be applied in the future for proving the
security of other protocols by using similar methods, and, in particular, for proving the
security of other QKD protocols that use only one basis for the information bits, such
as [14, 18, 20] mentioned above.
We note that our security proof, similarly to many other full security proofs of
QKD, assumes an ideal implementation (of ideal quantum systems consisting of ex-
actly one qubit) and theoretical attacks. Practical implementations of QKD, almost
always using photons, exist (see [33, 22] for details); their security analysis is much
more complicated, because both Alice’s photon source and Bob’s detector devices have
weaknesses and deviations from the theoretical protocol (especially when more than
one photon is emitted by Alice or is sent by the eavesdropper). Those imperfections
give rise to various practical attacks, such as the “Photon-Number Splitting” attack [34]
(in which the eavesdropper takes advantage of emissions of two or more photons by
Alice and gets full information) and the “Bright Illumination” attack [35] (in which the
eavesdropper takes advantage of a weakness of specific detectors used by Bob and gets
full information).
Possible solutions to those problems of actual physical realizations (see [33, 22]
for more details) include a much more careful analysis of the practical devices and of
practical implementations; “Measurement-Device Independent” QKD protocols [36,
37, 38, 39], that may be secure even if the measurement devices are controlled by the
adversary; and “Device Independent” QKD protocols [40, 41, 42], that may be secure
even if all the quantum devices are controlled by the adversary.
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